Sunday, 31 May 2015

Issues regarding INEDs

From the last newsletter of MSWG:


... the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2012 (the Code) recommends a 9-year term limit for INEDs (Independent Non-executive Directors) and the Listing Requirements makes reference to this recommendation where the companies must either comply or explain.

The Code provides under Recommendation 3.3 that there must be strong justifications for the board of a PLC to retain as an INED a person who has served in that capacity for more than 9 years. Also, the prior approval of shareholders is required to be sought.

Over the last 3 years, since the introduction of the Code in June 2012, we observed that the following have been practised:

  • INEDs tenure limit of 9 years have been exceeded sometimes as long as 20 or 30 years.
  • INEDs have been re-elected over the limit without strong justifications.
  • No resolutions were proposed for re-elections.
  • Multiple number of INEDs who have exceeded the limit were being put up for re-election simultaneously.

Focus Malaysia wrote an article (partially behind paywall) about the same matter: "Firms don’t fully comply with governance code".

My opinion, for what it is worth:

  • Asking Board of Directors to give a justification about the independence of a director whose tenure limit exceeds 9 years is akin to asking companies if their Corporate Governance is any good: both will result in useless, self serving statements.
  • With 55% of the listed companies on Bursa having INEDs with a tenure of more than 9 years, the obvious conclusion is that voluntary measures don't work. If the regulators want to be serious about this rule then they should simply enforce it. INEDs who are deemed to be useful to a listed company can still stay on, but as an non-independent director.

David Webb wrote "Principles of Responsible Regulation", one snippet:


As a result of the prevalence of controlling shareholders, investors large and small are usually minority shareholders, and if they are to have any real influence in the ordinary decision-making of companies, then they should have proper representation in the form of truly independent directors in the board room. But they don't.

Under HK listing rules, a so-called "Independent Non-Executive Director" is only as independent as the controlling shareholder wants him (or occasionally her) to be, because the controller gets to vote on the elections in general meetings. The result is often a sham system of illusory checks and balances where rubber stamps fill the required 3 seats on the board (or 1/3, whichever is greater) and form the committees that are supposed to monitor the executive management of the company.


And his recommendation:


"Independent directors should be elected by independent shareholders; any shareholder or the board can nominate candidates, but controlling shareholders must abstain from voting."


Webb's other recommendations also appear to be highly relevant in the Malaysian situation, with the exception of the second (Malaysia does have quarterly reporting).


On another matter, not only INEDs have an important role to perform versus minority shareholders, external auditors also.

Michael Dee wrote an open letter to the employees of Noble Group, his third recommendation being:


" ..... speaking of the now extinct Lehman Brothers, change your auditor, E&Y, who have been auditing Noble’s finances for 20 years now.

This is far, far too long. Auditors are guardians for investors and 20 years breeds too cozy a relationship. E&Y were Lehman’s auditor along with other infamous companies now defunct.

Noble says they rotate E&Y partners every five years but this is just substituting players on the same team. Your management have said E&Y doesn’t have to defend your financials, however they should defend their role in singing off on them.

Here it is instructive to review two aspects of E&Y which are relevant to establishing how much trust one should have in their work. First, as Lehman’s auditor they signed off on the earlier mentioned Repo 105.

Since then, it must be noted, E&Y has paid US$109 million in fines and penalties relating to their Lehman auditing work, including $10 million just recently paid to NY State over their role in the Lehman collapse.

“Auditors will be held accountable when they violate the law, just as they are supposed to hold the companies they audit accountable,” said New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman.

The Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), an accounting watchdog established by the US Congress has recently issued scathing comments about E&Y.

As reported by the WSJ in 2012 and 2013 the PCAOB found in their review of over 100 audits that they were deficient about 50 percent of the time.

In half of the audits reviewed, “E&Y hadn’t obtained enough evidence to support its audit opinions giving its clients a clean bill of health“ as reported in the WSJ last year.

But this isn’t a recent problem, the WSJ also reported in 2011 that in over half of the E&Y deficient audits it was because “E&Y was deficient in its testing of how clients applied fair value to their hard-to-value securities”.

This is directly relevant to Iceberg’s charges. Also directly relevant is that in 2012 it was reported E&Y had paid a record US$2 million fine with the PCAOB Chairman saying; “These audit partners and E&Y — the company’s outside auditor for more than 20 years — failed to fulfill their bedrock responsibility”. Not a ringing endorsement I would say."


I think it would be a good idea if listed companies are forced to change auditor every say ten years. It would increase the chance that possible irregularities would be noticed, especially in cases where auditors have become "too cozy" to the companies they are auditing, or when their fees for non-audit related services have become too high.

Friday, 29 May 2015

Hanergy: SFC is investigating

It seems that the SFC has started an investigation in the remarkable rise and fall of Hanergy, according to this article in The Financial Times. Some snippets:


Hong Kong’s securities watchdog has confirmed Hanergy is under investigation — hours after the troubled solar panel maker’s chairman dismissed any such probe as “purely rumour”.

In the interview with Xinhua, China’s official news agency, Mr Li lashed out at reports that followed the spectacular crash of its share price, which wiped nearly $19bn off Hanergy’s market capitalisation.

He said: “We can say that in Hanergy has never in its history been better than it is today, our business is prospering, and this is a great time for Hanergy.”

In his interview Mr Li said it was impossible for any investigation to be under way without his knowledge — a sentiment undermined by the SFC statement.

“This is purely rumour, there is no such possibility,” he said. “I would be the first to know if the authorities were really planning a probe. But I know nothing about such news.”

Mr Li, in the Xinhua interview, also appeared to address concerns that he had used shares of the company as collateral to secure loans, saying the company did not owe overdue bank loans or interest payments to any bank.

We never did before, we don’t now and I believe we won’t in the future,” he said.


If those statements are "entirely true", I have strong doubts about that, time will tell. The stock is still suspended.

In the mean time, at least one complaint has been filed in Hong Kong, by none other than David Webb.

Wednesday, 27 May 2015

AirAsia X: is the rights issue enough? (3)

I wrote before:


".... its 2014 loss is 1.3 times the amount the company wants to raise through its rights issue. The obvious question would be: how long will the rights issue last? The company still has not shown a single year of profit (corrected for one-off items and deferred tax)."

AirAsia X announced today another large quarterly loss, RM 126 Million this time.

The company will soon receive the much needed RM 391 Million cash from it's rights issue.

But how long will that last?

After taking out the deferred tax assets (which I think it never should have counted in the first place), the company lost RM 1.07 Billion over its life time.

And then, there are capital commitments running in the tens of Billions:



How is this going to end?

Icon Offshore: former CEO "to focus on personal matters"

The company announced today:




To put in "a bit more perspective" why the formed CEO might have opted not to be re-elected, please read:

"Icon Offshore: CEO and COO remanded".

Icon Offshore is listed less than one year ago, and now already the CEO is gone.

People who invested in the company when it was listed will be very disappointed.

The share is currently trading at RM 0.53, a far cry from its IPO price of RM 1.85.