MBF, HLCap, MRCB

I often receive requests to look into certain corporate matters. I don't have as much time as I would I had, but will make a quick round-up of three deals that are hugging the limelight:


[1] Regarding the privatisation of MBF, MSWG is organising a forum on Thursday 28th February at 11AM, at MSWG's Training Centre in KL:

"Some shareholders have raised questions whether the earlier announcement by the Board on dividend arising from the sale of MBF Cards & Services would be paid to them. The privatisation is Tan Sri Mogan Lourdenadin's third attempt to take control of MBF Holdings. In 2010 Mogan had tried to take MBF private through a proposed selective capital reduction and repayment exercise by offering 65 cents per share, but was unsuccessful after minorities rejected the offer due to the low price."


[2] There are several articles about Hong Leong Capital (HLCap), suggesting something is brewing in this privatisation exercise:

From The Star, February 19, 2013:

"Shares in Hong Leong Capital Bhd (HLCap) continued to overshoot the privatisation offer price of RM1.71 made by parent company Hong Leong Financial Group Bhd (HLFG), finishing five sen up to RM1.87 in a weak broader market.

Dealers contacted randomly by StarBiz said they were still puzzled by the broad ongoing buying despite scant indication of any price increase in the buyout offer.

Some dealers continued to speculate that parties friendly to the offeror could be continuing their buying of HLCap shares from the market presumably to ensure HLFG secures a high percentage of shares from acceptances of the general offer, which would then help make the case for the delisting of HLCap, the group's stockbroking, investment banking and asset management arm."

Another article from The Star, February 22, 2013:

"Meanwhile, a new substantial shareholder has surfaced in HLCap Datuk Dr Yu Kuan Chon, the chairman and executive director of publicly-listed and family-run YNH Property Bhd.

Yu, a low-profile former medical officer for the Government, rapidly increased his stake in HLCap to 17.24 million shares or 6.98% as at Wednesday from 14.67 million shares or 5.94% on Monday.

It is not known if Yu is a friendly party to Tan Sri Quek Leng Chan, the patriarch of the Hong Leong group, who is taking HLCap private via his flagship Hong Leong Financial Group Bhd (HLFG) for RM1.71 per share.
......

Dealers have speculated that parties friendly to the offeror could have bought HLCap shares from the open market to ensure HLFG secures a high percentage of shares from acceptances of the general offer, which would help make the case for the delisting of HLCap."


Investors should be very cautious making investment decisions based on the above, since it is mere speculation, as pointed out by The Star. But the matter at hand might have serious consequences for minorities. Parties acting in concert (PAC) should be identified, since the price to be paid by the offering party should be the highest paid by them or any PAC.

Bursa Malaysia should monitor this situation very closely and make sure that minorities are not disadvantaged, either by not receiving timely and accurate information, or in money terms, not receiving the offer price they are entitled to.


[3] MRCB announced a deal with Gapurna, this matter is rather difficult, I refer to articles on the website of KiniBiz:

MRCB-Gapurna deal raises eyebrows
EPF says good to have entrepreneur head MRCB
MRCB-Gapurna: Salim defends deal, explains role
Could the EPF have done more?

And lastly, as a stark reminder that one should not mix politics with business:

MRCB’s chequered past colours its future

"With its political clout, MRCB grew to own such choice assets such as 20.2 per cent in Commerce Asset Holdings Bhd which owned Bank of Commerce Bhd (now CIMB)—via NSTP, a chunk of power generation companies like Malakoff Bhd, Sepang Power and Port Dickson Power among a whole host of other large assets."

How many billions of ringgits would the stake of CIMB alone be worth now, if only they still owned it?

"For its financial year ended August 1999, the company suffered losses of about RM1.45 billion from RM235.39 million in revenue. As at August 1999, MRCB was saddled with short term borrowings of RM923 million while the company long term debt commitments were RM473 million. On the other side of the balance sheet MRCB had cash and bank balances amounting to RM38 million."

In the Asian crisis many dreams came crashing down to Earth.

"Eventually MRCB was acquired by EPF in an apparent rescue of the group."

And that is how the EPF became the controlling shareholder.