Lots of good articles recently, many on subjects I am passionate about. Below are just some snippets, please click on the links for the full articles.
Is settling the right choice? (The Star)
When pushing for a no-contest settlement becomes the default option, market discipline is likely to soften. The people will perceive that the culprits are being let off after paying disgorgements, which is a little more than a rap on the knuckles for those with deep pockets.
Also, the lack of admission of liability is confusing. Are those guys innocent but are forced to settle to avoid being entangled in messy and costly trials? Or did they indeed commit the offences but seized the opportunity to avoid prosecution by paying money?
In addition, the SC [Securities Commission] should reconsider how it informs the market about its regulatory settlements. It issues press releases on criminal prosecution and civil actions, but not on the settlements. To get details of the latter, you need to check the SC website or refer to the commission’s annual reports or enforcement bulletins.
Could it be that the settlements are never meant to pack a deterrent punch? After all, how could they serve as a warning when they mostly escape public attention?
How the investing public loses from delisting (KiniBiz)
Preventing minority abuse during delistings
What do Maxis Communications Bhd, IOI Properties, Astro All Asia Networks plc and Seven Convenience have in common? All the companies have been listed, delisted and then relisted (some more than once) by their majority shareholders in the span of five years.
.... there are no specific regulations in way of what an offeror can give or threaten to take away during privatisation. Nothing governs valuations or a company’s listing status. So in a situation where an offeror is attempting a mandatory takeover that minorities do not like, the latter’s only option is to take the matter to court.
Of course, it would be akin to a kancil taking on a tiger. And Tiger is willing to bet that like the kancil, most minorities are unlikely to be able to match the spending capacity of the majority shareholders and would struggle to sustain a long-drawn court battle.
Similarly during the relisting process, the regulators keep intervention to a minimum. A source familiar with the regulators’ policies said that the SC demands that a relisting company provides justifications for its new valuations and details on why it believes it can perform better on the market this time around.
However, there are no pre-imposed rules which would make returning to the bourse difficult — regardless as to how the company treated minorities during the relisting process, or in the period between then and the relisting.
When the depth of the regulations are considered, the pertinent question seems to be if they are adequate to protect the companies covered in the earlier parts of this week’s series — or at the very least, give them a fair deal.
It would appear not. Rather, minorities in fact had very limited options during the privatisation deal. The majority shareholders benefitted handsomely both on and off the market, and at the expense of the minority investors.
Which leads to the question if Bursa is really the place for the retail and long-term investors. Tiger believes not, and feels that more must be done. The regulators should consider making delisting, promising companies, from the bourse tougher.
....majority shareholders, because they appoint management, know how much a company is valued. If they are willing to buy out the company, they must know something. And if a significant number of minority shareholders want to stay on for the ride, they should be allowed to and not be unceremoniously ejected from their seats which they have already paid for.
In a nutshell, Tiger says that minorities should not be frightened into selling their stakes. If Bursa is serious about increasing the participation of retail investors on the bourse, it is time that the SC and Bursa reconsider the issue of indiscriminate delisting and relisting, and start protecting the minority long-term investor. It’s easy to do.
Submission to HKEx on Weighted Voting Rights (David Webb)
The naked self-interest of HKEx in continuing to push for weakening our regulatory standards in the interest of its own profitability once again exposes the conflict of interests between being a regulator and a for-profit company. The Exchange has no profit incentive to care about quality, only about volume.
Your Chief Executive's proposition that HK risks "losing a generation of companies from China's new economy" is a false one. Good regulation improves the value added by markets, and investors will pay for that value. Companies which are willing to sign up to standards will get a higher price for their shares than they would in a market with lower standards, and the flip side of this is a lower cost of capital for the companies, both existing and new. There will always be exceptions to this overall outcome, but it is the overall outcome that matters. HK should be focusing on improving its legal and regulatory framework, not degrading it.
The vast majority of listing applicants and existing listed companies already have a controlling shareholder with at least 30% of the equity. They don't need their companies (or spin-offs) to issue second-class shares or pervert their constitution to cement their position. For the remainder with management who have been diluted by pre-IPO financing, most would have enough self-confidence in their abilities as managers that they would not need protections against removal, knowing that investors will only seek change in extreme circumstances and if they consider that new management can offer better value. This is just as true for "technology" companies as for any other industry, and the fact that shareholders have the reserve power to be able to change bad or stale management in itself provides a higher valuation than if they did not have that power.