I was rather disappointed about AirAsia's announcement on October 31, 2017 regarding irregularities at AirAsia India:
"The announcement is quite disappointing, both in size and in content. No timeline is mentioned, nor amount of money involved, no details are given (more information has been released through other channels than was announced).
Also AirAsia does not give a reason why shareholders were not informed before about this matter, the amount of money (allegedly the amount is around RM 13 Million) and the seriousness of the issues at hand seem to warrant that."
AirAsia made today a new announcement in this matter:
"..... as a result of investigations by AirAsia (India) Limited (AAIL) (which were conducted by an external agency), AAIL has been recommended to lodge a police report on the findings of the investigations. AAIL has consequently filed a police complaint before the competent authorities in Bengaluru, Karnataka, India on 9 November 2016. The police is investigating the matter. "
Why the delay of more than four months since the police complaint in making this announcement? No reason is given.
Showing posts with label India. Show all posts
Showing posts with label India. Show all posts
Wednesday, 22 March 2017
Thursday, 27 October 2016
Fight between Cyrus Mistry and Tata: AirAsia and Singapore Airlines are mentioned
Article from the website of MSN:
"Cyrus Mistry is right; problems of the Tata Group were inherited, not of his making"
Some snippets:
Almost every newspaper article which has anything to say about Tata Sons and the upheaval this company witnessed at a board meeting on Monday, lays the blame at Cyrus Mistry's door. Not many commentators have found fault with Mistry's predecessor Ratan Tata, nor have they bothered to analyse how Mistry was given a troubled empire and was left to deal with the mess, with his hands tied.
According to most analysts, nothing that Mistry did in his short four-year tenure was right. He allegedly did not uphold the values that the Tatas have stood for, he moved slowly on the group's restructuring and worst of all he sold family jewels like the steel business in UK - these are some of the myriad allegations which have surfaced in the last 48 hours, after Mistry was sacked as Tata Sons' Chairman.
But was Mistry the sole reason behind the Tata group's sub-optimal workings - the group's debt was rising, profitability was suffering and was he squarely to be blamed for the NTT DoCoMo fiasco or the crisis at the group's steel unit in the UK? According to this piece in the Economic Times, Mistry has denied most of these allegations in a mail to Tata Sons after the momentous Monday meeting. He has also leveled serious charges against members of the board, besides rightfully pointing out the harm to the group's credibility from this sudden sacking.
As several industry watchers wonder about corporate governance practices and whether these were followed while the board sacked Mistry, it is pertinent to note that Mistry could be right on all counts actually. He is surely not to blamed, at least not entirely, for what went wrong in the Tata group's telecom business, in the group's miscalculations of forming two competing ventures in the field of aviation, in the foreign acquisition spree pre-dating Mistry's chairmanship which led to the group's debt pile expanding.
The brand image of Tatas was in complete contrast with the ultra low-cost offering of AirAsia India. Even as the JV was continuously plagued with allegations about undue influence of the Malaysian parent - Telestra, which was finally bought out by the Tatas earlier this year after a messy battle splashed all over the newspapers, the airline's expansion plans also suffered due to bickering among the shareholders. And while this low-cost venture was struggling, the Tatas went ahead and forged another venture, with Singapore Airlines, to form full-service carrier Vistara in January 2015. Again at Ratan Tata's behest. The two airlines now operate at the fringes of India's domestic aviation market in terms of market share.
"Cyrus Mistry is right; problems of the Tata Group were inherited, not of his making"
Some snippets:
Almost every newspaper article which has anything to say about Tata Sons and the upheaval this company witnessed at a board meeting on Monday, lays the blame at Cyrus Mistry's door. Not many commentators have found fault with Mistry's predecessor Ratan Tata, nor have they bothered to analyse how Mistry was given a troubled empire and was left to deal with the mess, with his hands tied.
According to most analysts, nothing that Mistry did in his short four-year tenure was right. He allegedly did not uphold the values that the Tatas have stood for, he moved slowly on the group's restructuring and worst of all he sold family jewels like the steel business in UK - these are some of the myriad allegations which have surfaced in the last 48 hours, after Mistry was sacked as Tata Sons' Chairman.
But was Mistry the sole reason behind the Tata group's sub-optimal workings - the group's debt was rising, profitability was suffering and was he squarely to be blamed for the NTT DoCoMo fiasco or the crisis at the group's steel unit in the UK? According to this piece in the Economic Times, Mistry has denied most of these allegations in a mail to Tata Sons after the momentous Monday meeting. He has also leveled serious charges against members of the board, besides rightfully pointing out the harm to the group's credibility from this sudden sacking.
As several industry watchers wonder about corporate governance practices and whether these were followed while the board sacked Mistry, it is pertinent to note that Mistry could be right on all counts actually. He is surely not to blamed, at least not entirely, for what went wrong in the Tata group's telecom business, in the group's miscalculations of forming two competing ventures in the field of aviation, in the foreign acquisition spree pre-dating Mistry's chairmanship which led to the group's debt pile expanding.
The interesting part for Malaysia and Singapore involves the airline business:
In the email, Mistry said that the group's foray into aviation through joint ventures with Air Asia BhD and Singapore Airlines was at the behest of Tata. In both cases he had been presented with a fait accompli. He is right on both counts. It was Ratan Tata's long standing dream to enter civil aviation business - something which he had tried to do unsuccessfully twice in the past and was finally able to accomplish with AirAsia BhD when the government eased rules for foreign airlines to pick up a stake in Indian carriers. The joint venture company was formed in 2013, surprisingly, as a three way arrangement where the Tatas picked up only 30 percent and a lesser known Indian company Telestra Tradeplace held 21 percent.
The brand image of Tatas was in complete contrast with the ultra low-cost offering of AirAsia India. Even as the JV was continuously plagued with allegations about undue influence of the Malaysian parent - Telestra, which was finally bought out by the Tatas earlier this year after a messy battle splashed all over the newspapers, the airline's expansion plans also suffered due to bickering among the shareholders. And while this low-cost venture was struggling, the Tatas went ahead and forged another venture, with Singapore Airlines, to form full-service carrier Vistara in January 2015. Again at Ratan Tata's behest. The two airlines now operate at the fringes of India's domestic aviation market in terms of market share.
Mistry probably did not bless the creation of two separate, competing companies in the same business - a business where margins are wafer thin and profitability remains a pipe dream - so it would be foolish to lay the blame at his door. No one has understood till date why two airline ventures were formed or why Tatas initially chose to be 'silent' partners in AirAsia India.
I have in my possession a PDF-file which might be the alleged email from Cyrus Mistry, the header of the email reads as follows:
I do not know if this document is authentic, some parts have been blacked out, others have been truncated.
The first paragraph:
The parts about Singapore Airlines and Air Asia:
One crore is equal to 10,000,000 Rupees (or 10,00,000 as they write in India), worth about RM 623,000 or SGD 208,000.
It will be interesting to see how this will pan out, the fight between Tata and Cyrus Mistry, and if the above email is indeed authentic.
Sunday, 31 August 2014
Aircel-Maxis case: are the Malaysian authorities refusing to cooperate?
The CBI has chargesheeted former telecom minister Dayanidhi Maran for abusing his position to "constrict the business environment" forcing mobile operator Aircel to sell stake to Malaysian company Maxis in lieu for two sets of 'gratification' totaling rs 742 crore.
The chargesheet also figures the Maxis' owner T Ananda Krishnan besides Maran's brother and chairman of Sun Network Kalanithi Maran among others.
According to the chargesheet, the CBI is also looking into "the aspect of irregularity in grant of FIPB approval" in the stake sale. CBI said it was investigating the FIPB approval to Global Communication Services Holdings Ltd and the role of Indian partner, Sindya Securities and Investments Ltd, in holding 26% equity of Aircel.
Maran had approached the Supreme Court on Thursday saying CBI should be restrained from filing the chargesheet as the information from Malaysia was awaited and the investigation was incomplete. But CBI officials told ET that though Malaysia has refused to offer any information about the deal, the information received by the agency from UK and Mauritius was enough to file a chargesheet.
The above from an article in The Economic Times. Other articles about this matter can be found here, here and here, they contain the following sentences:
....the chargesheet would be based on evidence collected within the country as the Malaysian authorities were refusing to cooperate.
The CBI said it had completed the investigations without receiving a reply from Malaysia as responses from the UK and Mauritius helped them establish the charges.
The agency had told the apex court that overseas probe was being delayed due to the influence of the firm's owner in Malaysia who is "powerful politically".
The agency had also sought information from the Malaysian authorities through Letters Rogatory (LRs) but it did not get satisfactory response, after which the judicial requests were sent again. The reply to second LR is pending.
The Malaysian authorities should come forward and provide details regarding the above allegations of not cooperating. This case is already 8 years old and should be expedited, especially with two listed companies (Maxis and Astro) and several Malaysian persons being involved.
Sunday, 26 January 2014
"Mega" default in China?
Article published by Forbes: "Mega Default In China Scheduled For January 31".
I think that the title is rather exaggerated (the amount in question is about USD 500 Million, very small for a country like China), but I do agree it might cause some shock to the financial system towards retail investors and there will be some reputational damage. Partly that will be a much needed wake up call. The full article (some comments by me in red):
On Friday, Chinese state media reported that China Credit Trust Co. warned investors that they may not be repaid when one of its wealth management products matures on January 31, the first day of the Year of the Horse.
The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China sold the China Credit Trust product to its customers in inland Shanxi province. This bank, the world’s largest by assets, on Thursday suggested it will not compensate investors, stating in a phone interview with Reuters that “a situation completely does not exist in which ICBC will assume the main responsibility.”
That depends on which promises the product was sold to the people. For instance, was the word "guarantee" used? Work for lawyers. It all sounds a bit like the infamous minibonds.
There should be no mystery why this investment, known as “2010 China Credit-Credit Equals Gold #1 Collective Trust Product,” is on the verge of default.
The Chinese are definitely number one in the world in inventing "creative" names.
China Credit Trust loaned the proceeds from sales of the 3.03 billion-yuan ($496.2 million) product to unlisted Shanxi Zhenfu Energy Group, a coal miner. The coal company probably is paying something like 12% for the money because Credit Equals Gold promised a 10% annual return to investors—more than three times current bank deposit rates—and China Credit Trust undoubtedly took a hefty cut of the interest.
Yes, I assume that China Credit Trust took a nice commission, I hope they were transparent about it. The problem with products with high commissions is that they are often sold, not bought. There is just too much incentive for the selling party.
Zhenfu was undoubtedly desperate for money. One of its vice chairmen was arrested in May 2012 for taking deposits without a banking license, undoubtedly trying to raise funds through unconventional channels. In any event, the company was permitted to borrow long after it should have been stopped—reports indicate that it had accumulated 5.9 billion yuan in obligations. Zhenfu, according to one Chinese newspaper account, has already been declared bankrupt with assets of less than 500 million yuan.
The Credit Equals Gold product is not the first troubled WMP, as these investments are known, to risk nonpayment, but Chinese officials have always managed to make investors whole. CITIC Trust did that in 2013 on a steel-loan product in Hubei province, and a mysterious third-party guarantee rescued a Hua Xia Bank WMP. An investment marketed by ICBC’s Suzhou branch was similarly repaid.
"WMP" or "Guaranteed Products" or "Structured Products", many names have been used in the past. The public must understand that when returns are "promised" that are way beyond the risk-free rate of Fixed Deposits, then of course there is a (quite real) risk. There is no free lunch here.
There has never been a default—other than one of timing—of a WMP, so the Credit Equals Gold product could be the first. If it is, it will edge out the WMP that invested in loans to Liansheng Resources Group, another Shanxi coal miner. Jilin Trust packaged Liansheng’s loans into a wealth management product sold by China Construction Bank , the country’s second-largest lender by assets, to its customers. Liansheng is in bankruptcy, and it looks like the WMP holders will not be repaid in full.
A WMP default, whether relating to Liansheng or Zhenfu, could devastate the Chinese banking system and the larger economy as well. In short, China’s growth since the end of 2008 has been dependent on ultra-loose credit first channeled through state banks, like ICBC and Construction Bank, and then through the WMPs, which permitted the state banks to avoid credit risk. Any disruption in the flow of cash from investors to dodgy borrowers through WMPs would rock China with sky-high interest rates or a precipitous plunge in credit, probably both. The result? The best outcome would be decades of misery, what we saw in Japan after its bubble burst in the early 1990s.
I am not sure about that, of course the ultra-loose credit is basically spending money that still has to be earned, in other words future growth will decrease at least for some time. But China still has a lot going for it, so my guess is that it could mean a pretty large recession, partly cleansing the system, and then continued growth again. If China would really go into decades of misery, that would have tremendous negative effects for emerging markets which have partly piggybacked on China's growth.
Most analysts don’t worry about a WMP default. Their argument is that the People’s Bank of China, the central bank, is encouraging a failure of the Zhenfu product to teach investors to appreciate risk and such lesson will improve the allocation of credit nationwide. Furthermore, they reason the central authorities would never allow a default to threaten the system.
Observers make the logical argument that “to have a market meltdown, you have to have a market” and China does not have one. Instead, Beijing technocrats dictate outcomes.
That’s correct, but that is also why China is now heading to catastrophic failure. Because Chinese leaders have the power to prevent corrections, they do so. Because they do so, the underlying imbalances become larger. Because the underlying imbalances become larger, the inevitable corrections are severe. Downturns, which Beijing hates, are essential, allowing adjustments to be made while they are still relatively minor. The last year-on-year contraction in China’s gross domestic product, according to the official National Bureau of Statistics, occurred in 1976, the year Mao Zedong died.
Marc Faber commented that indeed China has invested too much in for instance infrastructure. But if one had the choice to either invest too much (China) or almost nothing (India), then he would still prefer the first. China will continue to grow and will start eventually using the infrastructure.
Why will China’s next correction be historic in its severity? Because Chinese leaders will prevent adjustments until they no longer have the ability to do so. When they no longer have that ability, their system will simply fail. Then, there will be nothing they can do to prevent the freefall.
We are almost at that critical point, as events last June and December demonstrate. The PBOC did not try to tighten credit as analysts said in June and December; it simply did not add liquidity. The failure to add liquidity caused interbank rates to soar and banks to default on their interbank obligations. In the face of the resulting crises, the central bank backed down both times, injecting more money into state banks and the economy. So Chinese leaders showed us twice last year that they now have no ability—or no will—to deal with the most important issue they face, the out-of-control creation of debt.
There are rumors that local authorities in Shanxi will either find cash so that Liansheng can pay back its loans or force institutions to roll over the WMP marketed by Jilin Trust. Similarly, there are suggestions that ICBC, despite its we’re-not-responsible statement, will produce dough for the Credit Equals Gold investors. Others say China Credit Trust, China’s third-largest such group as measured by assets, will repay investors in part. Repayment will avoid an historic default and postpone a reckoning. In all probability, authorities will be able to get past Zhenfu if they try to do so.
Even if Beijing makes sure there is no default on January 31, we should not feel relief. Just as Zhenfu followed Liansheng, there will be another WMP borrower on the edge of disaster after Zhenfu. And there are many Lianshengs and Zhenfus out there. There may have been 11 trillion yuan in WMPs at the end of last year.
And at the same time China’s money supply and credit are still expanding. Last year, the closely watched M2 increased by only 13.6%, down from 2012’s 13.8% growth. Optimists say China is getting its credit addiction under control, but that’s not correct. In fact, credit expanded by at least 20% last year as money poured into new channels not measured by traditional statistics. That appears to be in excess of credit expansion in 2012.
Even if credit expansion slowed last year, Silvercrest Asset Management’s Patrick Chovanec tells us why we should be concerned. As he wrote today, “Looking purely at the decline in the year-on-year rate of credit expansion is kind of like arguing that if I chase my shot of vodka with a pint of beer, I’m actually exercising moderation because the alcohol proof level of my drinks is falling.”
I think that the title is rather exaggerated (the amount in question is about USD 500 Million, very small for a country like China), but I do agree it might cause some shock to the financial system towards retail investors and there will be some reputational damage. Partly that will be a much needed wake up call. The full article (some comments by me in red):
On Friday, Chinese state media reported that China Credit Trust Co. warned investors that they may not be repaid when one of its wealth management products matures on January 31, the first day of the Year of the Horse.
The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China sold the China Credit Trust product to its customers in inland Shanxi province. This bank, the world’s largest by assets, on Thursday suggested it will not compensate investors, stating in a phone interview with Reuters that “a situation completely does not exist in which ICBC will assume the main responsibility.”
That depends on which promises the product was sold to the people. For instance, was the word "guarantee" used? Work for lawyers. It all sounds a bit like the infamous minibonds.
There should be no mystery why this investment, known as “2010 China Credit-Credit Equals Gold #1 Collective Trust Product,” is on the verge of default.
The Chinese are definitely number one in the world in inventing "creative" names.
China Credit Trust loaned the proceeds from sales of the 3.03 billion-yuan ($496.2 million) product to unlisted Shanxi Zhenfu Energy Group, a coal miner. The coal company probably is paying something like 12% for the money because Credit Equals Gold promised a 10% annual return to investors—more than three times current bank deposit rates—and China Credit Trust undoubtedly took a hefty cut of the interest.
Yes, I assume that China Credit Trust took a nice commission, I hope they were transparent about it. The problem with products with high commissions is that they are often sold, not bought. There is just too much incentive for the selling party.
Zhenfu was undoubtedly desperate for money. One of its vice chairmen was arrested in May 2012 for taking deposits without a banking license, undoubtedly trying to raise funds through unconventional channels. In any event, the company was permitted to borrow long after it should have been stopped—reports indicate that it had accumulated 5.9 billion yuan in obligations. Zhenfu, according to one Chinese newspaper account, has already been declared bankrupt with assets of less than 500 million yuan.
The Credit Equals Gold product is not the first troubled WMP, as these investments are known, to risk nonpayment, but Chinese officials have always managed to make investors whole. CITIC Trust did that in 2013 on a steel-loan product in Hubei province, and a mysterious third-party guarantee rescued a Hua Xia Bank WMP. An investment marketed by ICBC’s Suzhou branch was similarly repaid.
"WMP" or "Guaranteed Products" or "Structured Products", many names have been used in the past. The public must understand that when returns are "promised" that are way beyond the risk-free rate of Fixed Deposits, then of course there is a (quite real) risk. There is no free lunch here.
There has never been a default—other than one of timing—of a WMP, so the Credit Equals Gold product could be the first. If it is, it will edge out the WMP that invested in loans to Liansheng Resources Group, another Shanxi coal miner. Jilin Trust packaged Liansheng’s loans into a wealth management product sold by China Construction Bank , the country’s second-largest lender by assets, to its customers. Liansheng is in bankruptcy, and it looks like the WMP holders will not be repaid in full.
A WMP default, whether relating to Liansheng or Zhenfu, could devastate the Chinese banking system and the larger economy as well. In short, China’s growth since the end of 2008 has been dependent on ultra-loose credit first channeled through state banks, like ICBC and Construction Bank, and then through the WMPs, which permitted the state banks to avoid credit risk. Any disruption in the flow of cash from investors to dodgy borrowers through WMPs would rock China with sky-high interest rates or a precipitous plunge in credit, probably both. The result? The best outcome would be decades of misery, what we saw in Japan after its bubble burst in the early 1990s.
I am not sure about that, of course the ultra-loose credit is basically spending money that still has to be earned, in other words future growth will decrease at least for some time. But China still has a lot going for it, so my guess is that it could mean a pretty large recession, partly cleansing the system, and then continued growth again. If China would really go into decades of misery, that would have tremendous negative effects for emerging markets which have partly piggybacked on China's growth.
Most analysts don’t worry about a WMP default. Their argument is that the People’s Bank of China, the central bank, is encouraging a failure of the Zhenfu product to teach investors to appreciate risk and such lesson will improve the allocation of credit nationwide. Furthermore, they reason the central authorities would never allow a default to threaten the system.
Observers make the logical argument that “to have a market meltdown, you have to have a market” and China does not have one. Instead, Beijing technocrats dictate outcomes.
That’s correct, but that is also why China is now heading to catastrophic failure. Because Chinese leaders have the power to prevent corrections, they do so. Because they do so, the underlying imbalances become larger. Because the underlying imbalances become larger, the inevitable corrections are severe. Downturns, which Beijing hates, are essential, allowing adjustments to be made while they are still relatively minor. The last year-on-year contraction in China’s gross domestic product, according to the official National Bureau of Statistics, occurred in 1976, the year Mao Zedong died.
Marc Faber commented that indeed China has invested too much in for instance infrastructure. But if one had the choice to either invest too much (China) or almost nothing (India), then he would still prefer the first. China will continue to grow and will start eventually using the infrastructure.
Why will China’s next correction be historic in its severity? Because Chinese leaders will prevent adjustments until they no longer have the ability to do so. When they no longer have that ability, their system will simply fail. Then, there will be nothing they can do to prevent the freefall.
We are almost at that critical point, as events last June and December demonstrate. The PBOC did not try to tighten credit as analysts said in June and December; it simply did not add liquidity. The failure to add liquidity caused interbank rates to soar and banks to default on their interbank obligations. In the face of the resulting crises, the central bank backed down both times, injecting more money into state banks and the economy. So Chinese leaders showed us twice last year that they now have no ability—or no will—to deal with the most important issue they face, the out-of-control creation of debt.
There are rumors that local authorities in Shanxi will either find cash so that Liansheng can pay back its loans or force institutions to roll over the WMP marketed by Jilin Trust. Similarly, there are suggestions that ICBC, despite its we’re-not-responsible statement, will produce dough for the Credit Equals Gold investors. Others say China Credit Trust, China’s third-largest such group as measured by assets, will repay investors in part. Repayment will avoid an historic default and postpone a reckoning. In all probability, authorities will be able to get past Zhenfu if they try to do so.
Even if Beijing makes sure there is no default on January 31, we should not feel relief. Just as Zhenfu followed Liansheng, there will be another WMP borrower on the edge of disaster after Zhenfu. And there are many Lianshengs and Zhenfus out there. There may have been 11 trillion yuan in WMPs at the end of last year.
And at the same time China’s money supply and credit are still expanding. Last year, the closely watched M2 increased by only 13.6%, down from 2012’s 13.8% growth. Optimists say China is getting its credit addiction under control, but that’s not correct. In fact, credit expanded by at least 20% last year as money poured into new channels not measured by traditional statistics. That appears to be in excess of credit expansion in 2012.
Even if credit expansion slowed last year, Silvercrest Asset Management’s Patrick Chovanec tells us why we should be concerned. As he wrote today, “Looking purely at the decline in the year-on-year rate of credit expansion is kind of like arguing that if I chase my shot of vodka with a pint of beer, I’m actually exercising moderation because the alcohol proof level of my drinks is falling.”
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