Blast from the Past: the Carrian case (3)

I wrote about this subject before (here and here).

The CIA has recently released files from their archive, and this document (unfortunately a "sanitized" copy) has to do with the Carrian case.

Has anything been learned from this scandal from the past? Looking at the more recent scandals like 1MDB, I strongly doubt it.

Blast from the Past: UEM/Renong

From an "old hand" in the industry, someone who was first a bank analyst, then Head of Research and finally Sales. Lightly edited by me:


..... But then the super bull-run for Malaysia came in 1993 when the index moved from a low of 645 points to a high of 1332. Everyone was a winner then and I remember the words of my remisier friend, “money is like free!”. From thereon I was hooked. The adrenalin rush, the excitement of coming to the office every morning and feeling smug given that all your BUY recommendations are winners.

Its was am amazing ride right  to the BIG crash in 1997. Along the way I became the infrastructure analyst and was right at the epicenter of the major infrastructure projects from the North South Expressway, the Second Link, LRT and all the highways and byways and the KLCC twin towers, Gelang Patah – now known as Iskandar Malaysia and Putrajaya.

Naturally I was the analyst for the infamous UMNO related UEM/Renong group.  I still remember accompanying clients on helicopters to have an overview of  the construction works and the countless roadshows globally. I even travelled on the Concorde from London to New York for an IPO. Those were the go-go days. …. Of course I was not with [company] then!

UEM/Renong was also the tipping point for both the Malaysia market and me as an analyst for the wrong reasons.  It was the TWO stocks to own in Malaysia as there were the prime beneficiaries of the government’s infrastructure spending and took the market to dizzy heights. The music stopped 17th November 1997 when UEM bought a 33% stake in its parent Renong @ RM3.24 a piece when the market price was RM1.90 for USD685.8m. This was  just when the Asian Financial crisis was unravelling!  The market lost 20% in value in three days. Talk about governance. 

...... The Malaysian market has never seen those days since. 


Interesting that the "old hand" mentioned the UEM/Renong scandal as the tipping point, and not for instance the capital controls, or any of the other scandals of those days.

As Warren Buffett mentioned: "It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it. If you think about that, you'll do things differently.".

Unfortunately for Malaysia, in the UEM/Renong case things were not done differently, and the country suffered a huge reputational damage.

Have we learned anything from that episode, was there ever a proper analysis done what exactly happened, why, by whom, who profited and when, by an independent committee? No.

For those people that are counting for an inkling of justice in the 1MDB case, these are not hopeful words.

Blast from the Past: Pan-Electric (3)

I wrote before about the Pan-Electric scandal, here and here.

I wrote before about the divorce battle of Khoo Kay Peng and Pauline Chai, here and here.

As expected in a bitter separation, lots of mud is being thrown at each other.

This blog usually doesn't focus on toilet seats nor about the number of shoes that one person has (Telegraph).

But another, more interesting revelation reveals a new link between the two above cases. From the Malaysian Insider website:

"Tycoon hubby sought Canadian citizenship to avoid arrest, ex-beauty queen claims".

Some snippets:


Billionaire Tan Sri Khoo Kay Peng had asked for a Canadian citizenship in the 1990s to avoid arrest by the Singaporean authorities, which was investigating a company belonging to him in the island state, his wife Pauline Chai told the High Court here today. Speaking during the couple’s highly publicised domicile trial here, the former Miss Malaysia claimed that Khoo had wanted to apply for permanent residency in Canada because the country had no extradition co-operation with Singapore. She said the tycoon had then feared for his life after some of his colleagues were arrested by the Singaporean authorities over allegations of mismanagement involving his company, Pan Electric Industries. “We had first stayed in Australia but when the Pan Electric fiasco (happened), two of his friends got investigated so we moved to Canada because they had no extradition laws there.

According to her affidavit that was sighted by Malay Mail Online, Khoo’s lawyers had first advised him and his family to move to Australia, where he, Chai and his children eventually settled down. But Chai claimed her husband fell into depression, as he was not certain if Australian laws could still prevent him from being extradited to Singapore.


This seems to be a new twist in the Pan-Electric case. What was known is the below information.

There are references in this newspaper clip from the Straits Times, some snippets:

A detailed article from The Ant Daily can be found here:

"The forgotten corporate high-flyer"

It appears that, due to the high-profile divorce case, the high-flyer is not that much forgotten anymore. If he likes that kind of attention is another matter.

The Pan-Electric case still seems to attract quite some attention, after all those years. And probably rightly so, it was the only case that brought the share markets of both Singapore and Malaysia to a halt for three days.

SC's bid to disqualify judge rejected

According to this article on the website of The Edge Malaysia, the Securities Commission lost its bid to disqualify High Court Judge Abang Iskandar Abang Hashim to recuse himself from hearing a suit challenging Sime Darby's controversial purchase of a 30% interest in E&O. Hopefully the suit by minority shareholder Michael Chow Keat Thye will continue soon.

This is not the first time that Sime Darby has run into problems regarding a share purchase. Blast from the Past, from the website from the Securities Commission: Sime Darby and its Board of Directors being reprimanded in 1998 regarding the purchase of shares of Sime Bank. Was the reprimand a strong enough punishment, and why were the Directors involved not individually named? Some snippets:


The Securities Commission (SC) today reprimands Sime Darby Berhad (Sime Darby) and its Board of Directors responsible for the take-over of Sime Bank Berhad (Sime Bank)


In the case of Sime Darby and its Board of Directors responsible for the take-over of Sime Bank, the SC had decided to issue them a public reprimand for their indifferent attitude in handling the take-over transaction of Sime Bank resulting in the breach of Rule 34.1 (a) of the Code after taking into consideration their subsequent attempts to fulfill their obligation, which unfortunately could not be discharged as a consequence of the drastic change in the financial position of Sime Bank which resulted in their having to divest their entire shareholdings in Sime Bank.


Chronology of events in Sime Darby's case

On 11 November 1995, Sime Darby entered into a conditional agreement with Datuk Keramat Holdings Berhad (DKH) and UMBC Holdings Sdn Bhd, a wholly-owned subsidiary of DKH, to acquire 201,168,890 Sime Bank shares, representing 60.35% equity interest in Sime Bank, for a cash consideration of RM1,300,000,000 or approximately RM6.46 per share. Following this acquisition, Sime Darby was obliged to extend a MGO on the remaining 132,164,322 shares in Sime Bank under Rule 34.1(a) of the Code.

The SC had on 16 February 1996 given its confirmation to Sime Darby that they had to undertake the MGO for the remaining shares in Sime Bank. The acquisition of Sime Bank by Sime Darby Group was completed on 22 April 1996, whereby the acquisition was made through, Sime Darby's wholly-owned subsidiary, Sime Darby Financial Services Holdings Sdn Bhd (SDFS). Sime Darby did not carry out the MGO due to the limitation on its interest in Sime Bank permitted by Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) then.

Subsequently, on 12 March 1997, Sime Bank completed a rights issue of 166,666,606 Sime Bank shares at an issue price of RM6.50 per share on the basis of one new Sime Bank share for every two existing Sime Bank shares.

The SC had reminded Amanah Merchant Bank Berhad (Amanah), Sime Darby's adviser, of Sime Darby's outstanding obligation and the need to resolve the matter as soon as possible. Subsequently, Amanah, on behalf of SDFS, informed SC that SDFS had on 17 October 1997 obtained BNM approval and proposed to extend an unconditional mandatory general offer for the remaining shares in Sime Bank not already owned by SDFS. Between October 1997 and January 1998, several applications were made by Amanah, on behalf of Sime Darby, for revisions in the terms and conditions of the MGO.

Change in ownership

Towards the end of February 1998, Sime Darby indicated that it might not be possible for them to pursue the MGO as a change of ownership in Sime Bank was imminent. On 10 March 1998, Rashid Hussain Berhad (RHB), Sime Darby and KUB Malaysia Berhad (KUB) released a joint statement in respect of the signing of a conditional sale and purchase agreement for the acquisition by RHB Group of Sime Bank for the purpose of a merger with RHB Bank Berhad (RHB Bank). Sime Darby through its wholly owned subsidiary, SDFS, decided to dispose of its entire 60.35% equity interest  comprising 301,753,335 shares of RM1.00 in Sime Bank while KUB would dispose of 150,043,120 shares representing 30.03% equity interest in Sime Bank to RHB Bank Berhad (RHB Bank) for a total purchase consideration of RM770 million or approximately RM1.70 per share.

With the new development involving the changes in ownership in Sime Bank, the SC had, on 31 March 1998, written to Amanah to inform them of Sime Darby's outstanding obligation on the MGO and required them to revert on their plan to address the obligation. On 13 April 1998, Amanah replied and informed the SC that BNM via its letter dated 9 April 1998 had withdrawn its earlier approval given via a letter dated 17 October 1997 for SDFS to undertake a MGO and that Sime Darby was in no position to undertake the general offer.

SC issues show cause letter

The SC views seriously the failure of Sime Darby to carry out the MGO and had on the 12 May 1998 issued a show-cause letter to the Board of Directors of Sime Darby seeking explanations on why appropriate action should not be taken against them for failure to undertake a general offer for the remaining voting rights in Sime Bank. Sime Darby explained that the market downturn and the financial problems at Sime Bank and Sime Securities Sdn Bhd had prevented them from discharging their MGO obligation.

Blast from the Past: the Carrian case (2)

Interesting documentary from Crime & Investigation about Jalil Ibrahim, the real hero in the Carrian case:

"The Banker who knew too much"

According to this website, Jalil Ibrahim is the only civilian who ever received the highest federal award of Seri Pahlawan Gagah Perkasa ("Gallant Warrior" or "Warrior of Extreme Valour").

David webb has a collection of articles about George Tan of the Carrian case, but unfortunately his website started only in 1998.

Through Google many newspaper clips can be found, here is one of them:

Blast from the Past: the Carrian case

I received several comments regarding the Carrian case. From Wikipedia:

The Carrian Group was a Hong Kong conglomerate founded by George Tan, a Singaporean Civil Engineer working in Hong Kong as a project manager for a land development company. The Group's principal holding company Carrian Holdings, Ltd. was founded in 1977.

In January 1980, the group, through a 75% owned subsidiary, purchased Gammon House (a commercial Office building, now Bank of America Tower) in Central District, Hong Kong for $998 million. It grabbed the limelight in April 1980 when it announced the sale of Gammon House for a staggering HK$1.68 billion, a price that surprised Hong Kong's Property and Financial markets and developed public interest in Carrian.

In the same year, Carrian capitalized on its notoriety by acquiring a publicly listed Hong Kong company, renaming it Carrian Investments Ltd., and using it as a vehicle to raise funds from the financial markets.

The group grew rapidly in the early 1980s to include properties in Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Japan, and the United States. At its peak, the Carrian Group owned businesses in Real Estate, Finance, Shipping, Insurance (China Insurance Underwriters Ltd), Hotels, Catering and Transportation (A Taxi fleet that was the largest ever in Hong Kong).

Carrian Group became involved in a scandal with Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad of Malaysia and Hong Kong-based Bumiputra Malaysia Finance. Following allegations of accounting fraud, a murder of a bank auditor, and the suicide of the firm's adviser, the Carrian Group collapsed in 1983, the largest bankruptcy in Hong Kong.

Of the group's numerous businesses, only the Carriana Restaurant remains.


Other links:

Bowring
ICAC 1
ICAC 2
BMF 1
BMF 2
Gwulo
Parmalat and Carrian
Asiasentinel 1
Asiasentinel 2

Blast from the Past: Pan-Electric (2)

The Attorney-General's Chambers (AGC) in Singapore has responded to the claims from Glenn Knight. It should be noted that Tan Koon Swan had pleaded quilty and that 14 other charges were not proceeded. This case will not be re-opened, as far as I can see, but still interesting that this old but very important case suddenly popped up again.

..... the AGC pointed out in its statement that CJ Yong had noted in his judgment that there had been no arguments about the correctness of the charge against Mr Tan when it was made.

The AGC said CJ Yong "did not go into any detailed discussion of Mr Tan Koon Swan's case or Mr Knight's conduct of the case. Specifically, CJ Yong did not express any opinion that Mr Tan was wrongly charged".

The AGC also stated that although CJ Yong might have disagreed with the view of the law in Mr Tan's case, his decision "could not and did not overrule" the decision in Mr Tan's case, as both cases had already been decided by the High Court, said The Straits Times.

"Differences in the courts' pronouncements on the law occur, especially in legal systems based on the common law," said the AGC. It added that the public prosecutor had decided to charge Mr Tan based on the evidence against him and the law. Mr Tan's lawyers had not taken issue with the charge or his conviction based on the law and facts.

Said the AGC: "Mr Tan Koon Swan was convicted on the basis of his own plea of guilt, based on the law and facts as was accepted by his own counsel."

There were 14 other charges not proceeded with against Mr Tan, who had already pleaded guilty to criminal breach of trust.

The AGC added: "It was said that the judgment in Cheam Tat Pang meant that Mr Tan Koon Swan had been wrongly convicted and that he was technically an innocent man. Mr Tan Koon Swan’s conviction stands, and he remains guilty of the crime that he had admitted to."

The AGC also highlighted another error made by Mr Knight in his book. He had said "the sentence imposed as including a fine of $1 million". The correct fine was $500,000, said the AGC.

When contacted by The Straits Times last night, Mr Knight said as there were two differing High Court judgments on the same issue, the matter should have been referred to the Court of Appeal for a clarification.

"At the end of the day, after CJ Yong's judgment in 1996, nobody has been charged since then under that particular section, to my knowledge."


For Malaysia, it was another case of mixing business with politics. Another old (updated) case is reported in the SCMP.

Some snippets:


UNITED NATIONS negotiator Razali Ismail has won praise for his efforts to bring democracy to Myanmar. He also is being criticised over a business deal his firm was clinching with the military regime as he was in talks for the release from house arrest of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

The former Malaysian ambassador was not doing anything unusual, observers said. The links between politics and business in Malaysia had become so entwined that such practices were common.

Malaysia experts interviewed by the South China Morning Post were split on whether Mr Razali, who has denied any conflict of interest, may have harmed the process of returning democracy to Myanmar. Pro-democracy activists and Western analysts - while stressing the details of the deal brokered by the Malaysian company Iris Technologies and the junta were not known - said such practices were wrong.

The Malaysian system has also been dragged into focus and activists said Mr Razali had highlighted an area needing reform.

Ms Gabriel said the revelations embarrassed Malaysians.

'This practice is something that human rights activists in Malaysia and I'm sure many other parts of the world are very concerned about,' she said. 'This uneasy mix of business and playing public roles as various personalities in negotiating for freedom or leading a country or being kept in an administrative role carries a very serious threat.' She called for Mr Razali's resignation from his UN post.

Her observations were backed by Mr Rasiah, who said the proximity of political interests and business was so common in Malaysia that sometimes it was not seen as a problem.

He did not believe the majority of Malaysians supported the system, but they could do little about it.

'There's not much scope to criticise the political leaders and to stop them,' he said.

Blast from the Past: CLOB

Again an excellent posting from "DanielXX" at this web address.

Having read the various postings in Shareinvestor.com for some time, it is surprising that an event which happened about eight years ago still evokes so much emotion among veteran investors in the stock market. Pan Electric and the Asian financial crisis nowadays seem like distant memories, yet the CLOB saga strikes a raw nerve among those who had their money in these stocks (including some of my relatives) when the Malaysia government froze CLOB accounts in 1998.

The move was a direct result of the Asian currency crisis, when foreign speculators shorted the currencies of highly leveraged Asian countries, with Southeast Asia being particularly hard hit. Dr Mahathir, then Malaysia's PM, came up with the idea of imposing capital controls (a move for which he was lauded later for its effectiveness) to curb speculation (if money could not be moved out, any gains foreigners made from speculating would essentially be frozen, hence the markets would stabilise).

Of course, this also meant the CLOB market facilitating buying of Malaysian shares on the Singapore market would be affected. CLOB, or Central Limit Order Book (don't ask me why it is so named... reminds me of Central Limit Theorem in statistics) was set up in Singapore to trade Malaysian companies over-the-counter in Singapore after the Malaysian and Singaporean exchanges separated in 1990. Over the years it had developed into the main avenue for veteran Singaporean investors to invest in Malaysian equities.

The amount of money in CLOB shares at the time of the suspension in trading in September 1998 gives a clue to the anguish that is still felt by many investors today. There were about 172,000 Clob investors on the books - as many as 95 percent of them Singaporeans - and the total shares had a value of approximately US$4.47 billion. That works out to about US$25,000 per CLOB investor (remember that the US$ was king then) .... an indication that these CLOB share buyers were not small fry. And yet they got killed by events beyond their control. Under the arrangements following the CLOB market suspension, all shares in CLOB accounts were to be eventually transferred to accounts in the Malaysian Central Depository for eventual trading on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). However, the Malaysian government feared a massive share overhang in the KLSE (given the enormous amounts of money tied up) if liquidation was made possible en-bloc and hence things dragged on as the SES (the predecessor of SGX) and the KLSE worked to facilitate the share migration.

There would be no clear resolution to the issue until early 2000, and between 1998 and then there was an ugly war of words between the Malaysian and Singaporean market authorities which served only to exacerbate the unfortunate situation. Bank Negara's (Malaysia's central bank) chief claimed that during the Asian crisis, CLOB shares were being borrowed to be short-sold on the Malaysian market, hence hinting at the reason why the CLOB market was suspended. It was further suggested that the Singapore authorities had done nothing to deter such damaging actions to the Malaysian market. The war of words then shifted over to the legitimacy of the CLOB market, with KLSE noting that the CLOB market was created "unilaterally" by SES to facilitate to generate revenue for the SES, was "never endorsed by the Malaysian authorities", and was effectively an "an unauthorised market for Malaysian shares" and that there were inherent risks to those who invested in CLOB shares. SES, of course, had never made public to its investors of such a risk. On its part, the latter declared that "trading of Malaysian securities on Clob was not authorised by Malaysian authorities because it required no such authorisation", and that it was essentially a win-win game as Singaporean money provided liquidity and support to Malaysian stocks. Of course, it was win-win so long as things were going fine.... it took a major dislocation like a regional financial crisis to unleash the inner demons.

Finally in early 2000 the two exchanges worked out a scheme of arrangement for letting CLOB investors trade out of their misery, where investors were offered two options, both of which involved releasing of CLOB shares on a staggered basis over >10 months, reflecting the KLSE's abovementioned concerns of a share glut should all be released at one go. The faster scheme involved payment (something like 2% upfront) of higher administrative fees to a Malaysian company, Effective Capital, which was linked to Malaysia's then-Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin, an indication of how business operates in Malaysia. CLOB investors were strongly urged by the Malaysian side to opt for the Effective Capital scheme. Although there were calls for this to be referred to the WTO given the rather unfair scheme of arrangement and rather threatening tones adopted by the Malaysian authorities to CLOB investors to accept the proposed schemes, it appears that ultimately the CLOB investors had been worn down sufficiently by the two-year impasse to succumb and sell off at huge losses. For a US$4.5B CLOB position (believe it was measured at 2000 market prices based on KLSE), Effective Capital offered US$1.5B to "take over the risk" of holding the long position. One knows that given its government links, it would have no problem disposing of this entire line eventually in the KLSE.

Out of this whole saga arose SIAS, Small Investor's Association of Singapore, which represented the bulk of CLOB investors in liaising with the various authorities. It also gave rise to the easily understood term "CLOB-bered". Most of all, it gave rise to a fear of Malaysian stocks, not just by Singaporeans but by most foreign investors, who saw the perils of putting their money in a market that could easily change tack when under pressure. There are plans by the SGX to restore trading links with Bursa Malaysia soon. Perhaps that might go some way to restore investor interest in this market.

The last two sentences do ring a bell, the Malaysian and Singaporean stock markets are indeed trying to link up, something that has been delayed. But please note that the above was written in 2006, six full years ago.

From the above it might be clear that Malaysians should not expect Singaporeans to jump on the first opportunity to trade Malaysian shares through a direct link. Even now, 14 years later, things have not been forgotten. The amount of USD 4.47 Billion might not look that much, but my guess is that it was calculated using the very depressed share prices of that moment.

Although it might indeed have been better to close CLOB in the long term, the way it was handled and the timing (in the midst of the Asian crisis) was simply horrific. CLOB accountholders should have been informed about the pending closing of the CLOB market, and all should gradually have been phased out.

Some links: Asia Times, Time Asia and Singapore Window.

Blast from the Past: Pan-Electric

In 1985 Pan-Electric Industries collapsed, causing lots of mayhem especially for its 5,500 shareholders who lost all their money in the company. Article from Wikipedia:

"Pan-Electric Industries was a Singapore-based company that specialised in marine salvage work, and had 71 subsidiary companies, including hotel and property interests, with a market capitalization of S$230 million. The company collapsed in 1985 due to unsettled forward contracts, forcing the stock exchanges of both Singapore and Malaysia to shut down for three days. At its demise, the company had a total debt of S$480 million, and all its shares held by 5,500 shareholders were found to be worthless overnight. As of 2000, it remains the largest corporate collapse in Singapore's history, and the only instance where the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) had to close. The Malaysian Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange was also forced to close for three days as a result.

In the aftermath of the collapse, key people in the company such as Peter Tham, Tan Kok Liang, and Tan Koon Swan were prosecuted and given varying jail sentences. The collapse of the company shook public confidence in the SES, causing prices of stocks to plunge. New securities laws were introduced in March 1986 to ensure that stockbroking firms can protect themselves against credit risks."


An amount of S$230 million corrected for inflation would now be worth about RM 1.3 Billion.

On (the excellent) website stocktaleslot "Bulls and Bears, Tales of the Zoo" a much longer description, also indicating the political consequences for Malaysia, since Tan Koon Swan was the President of the MCA.

It all looked like history, although very important, until suddenly the following news appeared on The Edge:


Koon Swan not "saying anything soon" on Singapore's wrongful prosecution:

Businessman Tan Koon Swan, the president of  the MCA in the early 1980s and founder of Multi-Purpose Holdings, told  theedgemalaysia.com he would not "say anything soon" on the mistake by  the Singapore government in prosecuting him during the Pan-El crisis in  the mid-1980s.

"I don't know whether I will do something. I am  overseas now. I will probably return tomorrow and maybe I will meet the  press then. But don't write anything that will put me in trouble. It's  very unlikely I will say anything soon," Tan said from Hainan when  contacted on his hand-phone.

In the just-published book "Glenn Knight, The Prosecutor",  the writer Glenn Knight — who was the famous prosecutor then —  confesses to having wrongly prosecuted Tan in 1985 and in the chapter on  the Pan El crisis, he mentions his apology to Tan Khoon Swan — a fact  hitherto unknown for 27 years.

Glenn slapped Tan with 15 charges  after the collapse of Pan-El Industries which caused the Singapore stock  exchange to halt trading for three days. Among others, Tan was alleged  to have committed criminal breach of trust (CBT) and share manipulation,  and a guilty finding sent him to Singapore's Changi Prison for 18  months.

In his book, Glenn has suggested Tan to seek "pardon"  from the Singapore President to wipe out his criminal record so that it  would mean he had not been convicted of any wrong-doing legally in this case, which also rocked the Malaysia stock exchange.

In response  to this, Tan declined to commit himself to any action. He said: "No, I  am not going to say anything." He also declined to say whether he would  sue the Singapore government for compensation for ruining his reputation  and his future.

The incident not only forced Tan to quit as MCA  president but also the collapse of his huge Malaysian-Singapore business  empire which comprised at least three listed companies then.

And  posting bail for Tan while waiting for the trial of the century was  Robert Kuok, Malaysia's richest man. Due to this high profile  prosecution, Glenn was awarded the Public Administration Gold Medal by  the Singapore government. But in 1990, Glenn himself was charged for CBT  and later jailed in Singapore.

The wrongful prosecution of Tan  was splashed on the front pages of two leading Chinese newspapers — the Nanyang Siang Pau and Sin Chew on Monday.

Nanyang said Glenn told Tan about his mistake in prosecuting him apologised to Tan when they met at a function two years ago.

Quoting a unnamed aide of Tan, Nanyang also said Tan has been advised to be cautious in his comment.

In previous interviews with this writer, Tan did say that he felt "cheated" during the Pan-El crisis.

He  said he was advised by "people in power" to admit guilt to get a light  sentence which would amount to a fine, but he was horrified to hear the  jail term when the verdict was read out in court.

But as a born-again Christian, he had tried to forgive all those who had caused hardship and agony to him.

Tan  is now a property developer with a lot of developments in China. He has  been made an "honorary citizen" of Hainan for his contributions there.


It still is an intriguing case, and this might be another, new twist in the story. However, details are still patchy (why does Glenn Knight think that Tan was wrongfully prosecuted?), so we have to wait for more news to draw any conclusions.

PS: another article in The Star, with a rather twisted logic that is hard for anybody (except legal people) to understand. Anyhow, I don't like the word "stealing" in the next sentence:

“Chief Justice Yong was of the opinion that the section I had charged Koon Swan with was wrong in law for we could not charge a person for stealing from a company because as a director, it was not a breach of the law in that sense,” he wrote.